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RECENT DECISIONS
rule enunciated in Weeks. And the Pennsylvania Supreme Court indi-
cates that it will also follow the federal law as to the Walder excep-
tion of the Weeks rule, which under Mapp it is not required to do.
JOHN W. LATELLA
TORTS - Statute of Limitations - Claims for Damages for Personal
Injury - Under Uniform Commercial Code, statute of limitations
for personal injury claims now four years, instead of two.
Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612.
In the case of Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works,' the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court enunciated a somewhat startling and far-reaching
rule of law. It interpreted certain provisions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code2 to mean that there is now a four year statute of limita-
tions for all actions for personal injury arising out of a breach of a
contract of sale. In so doing, the court departed from a long-standing
rule which prescribed a two year statute of limitations for all such
actions. The facts of the case which brought about this change now
follow.
Due to an allegedly defective underground conduit maintained by
the defendant gas works, gas escaped into the home of the plaintiffs,
Mr. and Mrs. Gardiner, causing personal injury to them. Thereupon,
they instituted an assumpsit action in the Court of Common Pleas
of Philadelphia County for an alleged breach of "agreement, war-
ranty, and promise." The plaintiffs maintained that under the con-
tract of sale for gas, 3 the defendant impliedly and expressly war-
ranted that the gas would be transmitted to them in a safe manner.
The injuries complained of were sustained on January 7, 1961. The
action was not commenced until January 15, 1963, exactly two years
and eight days later. The Gas Works filed a preliminary objection to
the complaint averring that plaintiffs' action was barred by the two
year statute of limitations on personal injury claims as set forth in
1. 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964).
2. Hereinafter referred to as the Code.
3. It is undisputed that the supplying of gas to the Gardiners' home on a
month-to-month basis falls within the definition of a "contract for sale" within
§2-106 of the Code, 12A P.S. §2-106.
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the Act of 1895.4 The Court of Common Pleas sustained the objec-
tion and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs appealed from the order
of dismissal on the ground that the four year statute of limitations as
set forth in section 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code 5 was con-
trolling. Plaintiffs also pointed out section 10-103 of the Code which
states that ". . . all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this Act
are hereby repealed." 6
Prior to this case, the general rule in the Commonwealth had im-
posed a two year statute of limitations on all actions for damages for
personal injuries, whether arising out of contract or tort. This rule
had been set forth in a series of cases, the leading one being Jones
v. Boggs & Buhl, Inc.7 In that case, the court, basing its decision
solely on the Act of 1895,8 denied a claim for damages for personal
injury brought three and one-half years after the alleged injury. In
stating the issue of this case, the court said:
Her (plaintiff's) injury, as an element of damage, is
squarely within the words of the Act of 1895, so that the
question is whether she may avoid the Act of 1895 by de-
claring as for breach of contract and thereby enlarge the
period in which she may sue, notwithstanding the two year
limitation.9
Its answer to the problem was:
Statutes of limitation are based on the necessity of ending
litigation. As the legislature in the Act of 1895 declared
two years a reasonable period in which to bring a suit to
recover for personal injuries, the courts should not extend
that time by allowing a party to keep alive the right to sue
by electing to sue in one form of action instead of another.' 0
4. Act of June 24, 1895, P. L. 236, §2; 12 P.S. §34 provides "Every suit here-
after brought to recover damages for injury wrongfully done to the person, in
case where the injury does not result in death, must be brought within two years
from the time when the injury was done and not afterwards."
5. Act of April 6, 1953, P. L. 3, §2-725, as amended; 12A P.S. §2-725 pro-
vides. "An action for breach of contract for sale must be commenced within
four years after the cause of action has accrued."
6. Act of April 6, 1953, P. L. 3, §10-103; 12A P.S. §10-103.
7. 355 Pa. 242, 49 A.2d 379 (1946). In this case, the purchaser of a coat
with a fur collar sued in assumpsit for injuries allegedly arising from a skin
disease caused by the fur collar and for the return of the downpayment made
on the price of the coat.
8. Supra note 4.
9. Jones v. Boggs & Buhl, Inc., supra note 7 at 245.
10. Id. at 246. It should be noted, however, that the plaintiff was allowed
recovery of her downpayment made on the price of the coat.
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In the case of Bradley v. Laubach and Pflieger, 1 where the plain-
tiff instituted an action in assumpsit for personal injuries sustained
by a druggist's failure to properly compound a prescription, the
court felt obliged "... to look beneath the form and ascertain the
real basis of the claim."' 12 The court stated:
There can be no doubt the basis of the claim is the injury
wrongfully done to the plaintiff's person. It is unimportant
whether it resulted from a breach of contract or from a tort
without a contract. For damages in such case the law re-
quires the suit to be brought within two years, and not
afterwards. It is impossible to avoid the effect of this re-
quirement by instituting the action in assumpsit. The gist
of the action is the test, not the form.' 
3
In the case of Bilk v. Abbotts Dairies, Inc.,1 4 a purchaser of milk
sued in assumpsit for injuries sustained when he swallowed glass
hidden in a quart of milk manufactured by the defendant. The action
was instituted after the two year statute of limitations on tort actions
for personal injury had run and the court refused to allow the claim.
The basis of this refusal was that even though the action was brought
in assumpsit, if the essence of the claim was to recover damages for
negligence, it would be considered as a tort action and all defenses
valid in such actions would apply.1 5 One such defense, of course,
was the two year statute of limitations imposed by the Act of 1895.
This was the state of the law in this area at the time the Code was
adopted. Basically following the Jones case and the earlier decisions
in this area, the Pennsylvania courts had refused to be led into apply-
ing a contractual statute of limitations to what were essentially tort
actions, even though they were labelled assumpsit. Then, with the
adoption of the Code, came conflict. The courts were now faced with
the statement of the drafters of the Code that its (the Code's) pur-
pose was to simplify and modernize the law relating to commercial
transactions and to make more uniform the laws of the various
jurisdictions in this area.' 6 The drafters of the Code also stated that
their purpose was to "... introduce a uniform statute of limitations
for sales contracts . .. " with four years being "... the most appro-
11. 23 Pa. Dist. 151 (1914).
12. Id. at 151.
13. Id. at 151-52. See also: Henkel v. Beitsch, 22 Pa. Dist. 895 (1912);
Boroswitz v. The Union Traction Co., 8 Dist. R. 676 (1899); Birmingham v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 37 S.E. 17 (1900).
i4. 147 Pa. S. 39, 23 A.2d 342 (1941).
15. Id. at 43. See also: The Practice Act of 1915, P. L. 483.
16. Act of April 6, 1953, P. L. 3, §1-102; 12A P.S. §1-102.
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priate to modern business practice.. . . 1 7 Above all, the courts were
faced with the statement in the Code that it (the Code) repealed all
earlier inconsistent legislative acts. 1S
The Gardiner case brought the entire situation to a final deter-
mination. It forced upon the court the task of deciding whether or
not the Act of 1895 was inconsistent with the provisions of the Code,
and whether the Code operated as a repeal of the Act of 1895.19
The court's solution of this problem was a poor one. Taking into
consideration the background and the basic purposes of the Code
and various principles of statutory interpretation, 2 0 it stated that
under the "new" law there will be ". . . a four year period of limita-
tion on all actions for breach of contracts for sale, irrespective of
whether the damages sought are for personal injuries or other-
wise." 2 1 In so deciding, the court departed from the rule set forth
in Jones and from a doctrine adhered to by the courts of many
states.2 2 It undermined the very policy that the Pennsylvania courts
over the years had struggled to maintain, and once again paved the
way for a lazy or negligent plaintiff, who would be rightfully denied
a cause of action under the normal two year statute of limitations for
tort actions, to obtain an undeserved second chance by merely suing
in assumpsit. While being so overly preoccupied with the basic pur-
poses of the Code, the court completely ignored the basic purposes
of the two year statute of limitations as set forth in the case of
Ulakovic v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.2 3 The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in that case stated that the policy of the law was to
expedite litigation and to discourage long delays. The court stated
that rights must be promptly enforced, lest witnesses disappear,
parties be removed to different localities, and human memories fail.
Delay, it was stated, would greatly prejudice the defendant and com-
pletely change the entire aspect of the case on both sides. Stale
claims, the court said, should not be allowed for "when neither party
makes any move in the suit for a long time, there is a natural, and
17. Id. §2-725.
18. Act of April 6, 1953, supra note 6.
19. Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, supra note 1 at 418.
20. The court specifically mentioned section 91 of the Statutory Construc-
tion Act which states: ". . . wherever a general law purports to establish a
uniform and mandatory system covering a class of subjects, such law shall be
construed to repeal pre-existing local or special laws on the same class of
subjects."
21. Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, supra note 1 at 420.
22. See: Basler v. Sacramento Electric Co., 166 Cal. 33, 134 Pac. 993;
Handtoffski v. Chicago Traction Co., 274 Ill. 282, 113 N.E. 620; McDonald v.
Camas P. R. R. Co., 180 Wash. 555, 38 P.2d 515; Griffin v. Woodhead, 30 R. I.
204, 74 Atl. 417; Bodne v. Austin, 156 Tenn. 352, 2 S.W.2d 100.
23. 339 Pa. 571, 16 A.2d 41 (1940).
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should be a legal presumption, that the dispute has been settled, and
adjusted to the satisfaction of both."' 24 Speaking of statutes of
limitation, the court said:
These and similar legislative enactments are expressive
of the feeling of mankind that where there are wrongs to be
redressed, they should be redressed without unreasonable
delay, and where there are rights to be enforced, they should
be enforced without unreasonable delay.
2 5
Yet, the effect of the decision in Gardiner is to encourage just the
opposite of the legislative purposes quoted above.
It should be mentioned at this point that the reason for the longer
statute of limitations in assumpsit actions is that proof in an as-
sumpsit action can be much more easily preserved than in a tort action
based on a personal injury. The claim in a contract action is usually
based on some written instrument such as the contract itself or a
bill of sale. This instrument can be preserved for many years and
the courts, in subsequent litigation, do not have to rely on the memo-
ries of the parties involved - memories which become less and less
reliable with the passage of time - as they often must in tort litiga-
tion. Yet, in the Gardiner case, where a personal injury, and not the
contract for the sale of gas, was the true basis for the claim, the
court applied a contractual statute of limitations.
Furthermore, the Gardiner case enunciates a rule of law which
completely ignores the true basis of the action pending, leaving one
free to litigate as an action" ex contractu what essentially and for
all intent and purposes is an action ex delicto. In the area of personal
injury claims, where the courts' dockets are already overcrowded
and where expediency in completing litigation is most important, this
decision fosters laxity and delay. Finally, the effect of the Gardiner
decision is to produce two statutes of limitations for personal injury
claims. It is fairly plain to see that this is not a healthy situation,
for the natural effect of this can be only to produce confusion and
delay.
The solution to the problem raised by the decision of the court in
the Gardiner case is obvious. The Pennsylvania courts must once
again apply one uniform statute of limitations to all personal injury
claims, whether arising out of contract or tort. Until that time, the
true basis of claims for personal injury will be ignored if, by some
maneuvering, a skillful attorney is able to inject a contract into the
dispute.
IRVING M. PORTNOY
24. Id. at 575.
25. Id. at 576.
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